Beyond the Grant: How the W. K. Kellogg Foundation Went Beyond Grantmaking to Contribute to a Major Early Childhood Initiative by Greeley, Stephen & Greeley, Beth
The Foundation Review
Volume 2 | Issue 3 Article 8
1-1-2011
Beyond the Grant: How the W. K. Kellogg
Foundation Went Beyond Grantmaking to
Contribute to a Major Early Childhood Initiative
Stephen Greeley
DCA, Inc.
Beth Greeley
DCA, Inc.
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/tfr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@GVSU. It has been accepted for inclusion in The Foundation Review by an
authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@GVSU. For more information, please contact scholarworks@gvsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Greeley, Stephen and Greeley, Beth (2010) "Beyond the Grant: How the W. K. Kellogg Foundation Went Beyond Grantmaking to
Contribute to a Major Early Childhood Initiative," The Foundation Review: Vol. 2: Iss. 3, Article 8.
DOI: 10.4087/FOUNDATIONREVIEW-D-10-00001
Available at: http://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/tfr/vol2/iss3/8
Beyond the Grant: How the W. K. Kellogg 
Foundation Went Beyond Grantmaking 
to Contribute to a Major Early Childhood 
Initiative 
doi: 10.4087/FOUNDATIONREVIEW-D-10-00001
R E S U LT S
Stephen Greeley, M.S., and Beth Greeley, M.S., DCA, Inc.
Key Points
· The seven-year SPARK (Supporting Partnerships 
to Assure Ready Kids) initiative, created by the  
W. K. Kellogg Foundation (WKKF), aimed at sys-
temically linking the pre-K and kindergarten worlds 
as a way to position vulnerable children for greater 
success in the early grades.  
· At the foundation, the initiative served as a depar-
ture point for WKKF to move from its traditional 
grantmaking role to a changemaker role.
· To create change, a foundation must articulate 
– and commit to – a point of view about how 
change can occur.  A theory of change can be a 
powerful tool to guide ongoing planning and ac-
tion.  
· A foundation that intends to create change must 
be prepared to take responsibility for results and 
create the internal structures that promote ac-
countability and collaboration. The nature of the 
SPARK effort called for abandoning the silos of 
portfolio management and developing a new col-
laborative approach.
· Foundations must be prepared to advocate for 
change, and bring their visibility, credibility, knowl-
edge, and convening power to it.
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R E F L E C T I V E  P A C T I C E
Introduction
The SPARK (Supporting Partnerships to Assure 
Ready Kids) initiative was one of the largest, in 
scope and duration, ever undertaken by WKKF. 
The ambition of SPARK was to discover how to 
stem the tide of children who arrive at kindergar-
ten each year unprepared to learn and, thus, start 
with a handicap that they might never overcome; 
half the academic gap seen in grade 12 can be at-
tributed to gaps that existed in first grade (Heck-
man, 2006). As one superintendent involved in 
the initiative put it, “When children show up in 
kindergarten with no pre-literacy skills, it’s like 
we’re already seeing who our eventual dropouts 
will be.”
SPARK also served as a first step for WKKF in 
moving away from traditional grantmaking to-
ward a more activist role as a change maker. This 
article examines the SPARK initiative in that way. 
Foundations seeking to achieve large-scale social 
progress are in a uniquely challenging position. 
They can bring funding, knowledge, visibility, 
influence, and a broad perspective to the issues 
they take on. Yet, the activities that yield change 
are usually in the hands of grantees and others. 
Foundations face a balancing act between inspir-
ing and supporting grantees to dictating and mi-
cromanaging, between staying in the background 
and lending a credible voice. SPARK proved a 
dynamic way for the Kellogg Foundation to tackle 
those issues. 
This article is based on a report prepared for 
WKKF by DCA, Inc., a consulting organiza-
tion that specializes in guiding efforts to achieve 
large-scale social progress. DCA was engaged 
by WKKF to assist grantees and foundation 
staff over the course of the initiative. The report 
presented a candid assessment of what went well 
and what didn’t work well in the SPARK initiative 
in terms of the new ways foundation manage-
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ment interacted with grantees, provided technical 
assistance, and took on a more visible advocate’s 
role in order to achieve a significant impact in 
advancing children’s school readiness.1
The Environment
School readiness was a fairly well-established 
concept when SPARK began. Research abounded 
on the skills that are essential to children’s suc-
cess in kindergarten and beyond.2  As seen by 
the emergence of childcare rating systems and 
advances in early-childhood education (ECE) 
accreditation, policymakers and early childhood 
educators increasingly strove for higher-quality 
programs to prepare young students for kinder-
garten (National Governors Association, 2005). 
Schools welcomed the prospect of gathering chil-
dren in who were better prepared to succeed. But 
each system continued to circle in separate orbits. 
Few3 were actively wading into that space be-
tween preschool education and the early elemen-
tary grades and the very idea of bridging the gap 
between preschool and kindergarten was contro-
versial. On a fundamental level, the concept trod 
on entrenched perceptions about professionalism, 
1 The authors reviewed the original internal SPARK 
proposal, a visioning statement, grantee reports, a WKKF 
Foundation/Education Commission of the States SPARK 
overview, an internal WKKF SPARK comprehensive his-
torical review, DCA’s own reports, the Walter R. McDonald 
& Associates Resource Organization Report and Initiative 
Evaluation Report, and publications prepared for a Nation-
al Forum on Linking Ready Kids and Ready Schools. DCA 
interviewed 25 individuals involved with SPARK, including 
current and former Kellogg managers, program and evalu-
ation staff; grantees; educators and school administrators; 
community and business partners; and the five resource 
organizations that supported SPARK. In the course of its 
work with SPARK, DCA also initiated discussions with 
67 national organizations representing early childhood 
education and care, state and local education policymak-
ers, parent- and family-serving groups, business organiza-
tions, and education and early care thought leaders. Those 
discussions informed many observations in this article.
2 The National School Readiness Indicators Project identi-
fied the following components of school readiness: physical 
well-being and motor development, social and emotional 
development, approaches to learning, language develop-
ment, and cognition and general knowledge.
3 The Foundation for Child Development, Graustein Me-
morial Fund, David and Lucille Packard Foundation, Annie 
E. Casey Foundation and the Council for Chief State School 
Officers were among a small group of organizations that 
had made a priority of working toward greater alignment of 
K-12 and community-based early care and education.
value, educational attainment, even social rank. 
Practically speaking, it presented yet another 
layer of work for education systems that already 
felt just about stretched to the limit. One grantee 
observed that a Head Start program had existed 
for years next door to an elementary school, but 
the preschool director had never been successful 
at establishing any relationship with the kinder-
garten teachers. The school principal saw the 
value, but had many other more urgent priori-
ties. There was no outside pressure to push for a 
tangible link between the two systems. 
Yet, nationally there was growing focus in 
education, policy, and philanthropic spheres on 
creating a continuum of learning for children and 
better alignment across the educational spec-
trum, as evidenced by the emergence of P-3 and 
P-20 councils in a number of states (Communica-
tions Consortium Media Center, 2009).  The time 
appeared ripe for a system-building initiative 
that moved beyond the theoretical to developing 
models for young children’s learning and school 
readiness at the community level that could yield 
lessons to be applied nationally.
SPARK Overview
Kellogg saw the logic of linking the pre-K and 
kindergarten worlds. It banked the SPARK invest-
ment on a belief that creating common expecta-
tions between the two sectors, building effective 
transitions from one to the next, and engaging 
parents to a much higher degree would be fruit-
ful. Additionally, the foundation recognized that 
such an effort would require as much “horse-
power” as possible, which meant reaching out to 
community and governmental partners to move 
the idea forward and give it life beyond the length 
of the initiative. As one educator involved in the 
initiative put it, SPARK represented “a container 
in which all the people and organizations involved 
in early childhood education could articulate a 
new system.” It was “the most comprehensive, co-
herent vision for the state and the school system 
to rally around three and four-year-olds” that this 
person had ever seen.
SPARK was launched in 2001 with eight grantees 
in the District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, 
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Hawaii, Mississippi, New Mexico, North Caro-
lina, and Ohio, representing urban and rural 
school communities and preschool traditions and 
practices of widely divergent character. While the 
target population was children ages 3 to 6 who 
were at risk for struggling in school, SPARK prog-
ress would benefit all children, vulnerable or not.
Like most large-scale, multiyear initiatives, the 
SPARK evaluation story is complicated to tell 
and is still unfolding, with longitudinal studies 
following SPARK preschoolers through the early 
grades. Some figures sketch the outline. Kellogg’s 
investment was $58.5 million over the seven years 
and the grantees were able to leverage that for an 
additional $106 million in financial and in-kind 
services to support their strategies and programs. 
Grantees report that 8,100 vulnerable children 
received services, which aided their preparation 
for, and transition to, kindergarten. Strategies 
in place for 2009 and 2010 would bring nearly 
18,000 more children into the SPARK “ready kids, 
ready schools” realm (Walter R. McDonald As-
sociates, 2009).
Five out of seven SPARK sites demonstrated 
that their students outperformed children from 
similar backgrounds for kindergarten readiness. 
The children served by two grantees performed 
as well as their peers, despite the SPARK chil-
dren’s vulnerabilities. Six grantees provided data 
from the first grade; two showed their students 
outperforming peers, while four others were on 
par. Data into second grade weren’t as available, 
although children at one site were doing better 
than their peers and children at a second site were 
doing as well as their peers (Walter R. McDonald 
Associates, 2009).
It is important to note, however, that each grantee 
has successfully positioned itself to continue the 
work: They have all begun the systems change 
work, forged the partnerships, energized the 
stakeholders, and raised up the SPARK notion of 
ready kids and ready schools to a level that won’t 
allow it to recede. There is a connotation to the 
word “initiative” in philanthropic circles that im-
plies initiatives stop when all the money has been 
spent. The consensus of SPARK grantees is that 
they are equipped, and committed, to carry on.
Developing a Theory of Change
The “container aspect” referenced earlier was 
a product of the SPARK initiative’s theory of 
change, which was developed by foundation staff 
with substantial input from leaders in the field 
of early childhood education. According to staff 
involved in this process, no Kellogg initiative 
had ever been so keyed to the development of 
and agreement to a theory of change. In fact, the 
foundation board held funding back for launching 
SPARK until the theory of change was in place – a 
decision that offered grantees and their partners 
clear direction while giving them the freedom to 
adapt to their individual circumstances. 
Arriving at the theory of change proved to be 
a long, painful process for foundation staff. It 
forced those involved to explore their own under-
standing of – and then agree on – how progress 
occurs on a large scale. But it yielded a durable 
result. One important aspect of the theory was 
that progress was essential on three fronts: “ready 
kids, ready schools, and ready communities.” 
Furthermore, it made clear that this progress 
required the synergistic efforts of two basic types 
of partners: partners that have a direct involve-
ment in children’s lives, who were best positioned 
to design and manage a more effective system to 
serve them; and partners who control or influence 
resources and policy, who were best positioned to 
provide a supportive environment for the system 
and work toward its sustainability.
Arriving at the theory of change 
proved to be a long, painful process 
for foundation staff. It forced 
those involved to explore their own 
understanding of – and then agree 
on – how progress occurs on a large 
scale. But it yielded a durable result.
Greeley and Greeley
82 THE FoundationReview
The SPARK theory of change (Figure 1) was 
significant because it helped reconcile an ongo-
ing internal debate about whether social change 
is a product of grassroots organizing or top-down 
leadership. The theory explained how it is a 
product of both. Parents, community-based early 
childhood educators, and elementary schools 
drive change by providing a well-grounded per-
spective on what supports children and families 
need in order to achieve school readiness, and 
work directly to create systems that provide those 
supports. School-system leaders, government, 
leaders and other education policymakers assist, 
expand, and sustain change by setting priorities, 
providing funding, and establishing supportive 
policies. Influential groups such as business lead-
ers and child advocates serve as important inter-
mediaries between these two groups by drawing 
attention to needs, promising solutions, and the 
benefits they offer. The SPARK theory of change 
framed the initiative and shaped the evaluation 
plan. By all accounts, the spirit of the work that 
resulted came very close to what the theory of 
change predicted.
The theory of change elicited worry, complaints, 
and confusion among the grantees when they 
first saw it. As it took hold, though, grantees said 
that it added real value to their work. Some hung 
poster representations of the theory of change in 
conference rooms to use almost like a road map. 
Others used it as a presentation tool, especially to 
outside groups like the Chamber of Commerce. 
One project director said it helped them “focus 
on who was not at the table. It gave us a visual 
to show the complex networks and linkages we 
needed to institutionalize change. It highlighted 
grassroots, while elevating the work to the next 
level.” The power of the theory of change to focus 
the work was essential to grantees in moving the 
effort forward.
Managing Change Making Versus 
Grantmaking
Kellogg was organized around the traditional 
foundation model of program directors holding a 
certain number of projects in their portfolios and 
working independently of their colleagues. With 
SPARK, the foundation set off in a new direction 
FIGURE 1  SPARK Theory of Change
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and envisioned a structure that gathered a num-
ber of program directors and staff from multiple 
functions (such as communications and evalua-
tion) together as a team. The idea was to bring a 
wide range of talents and experience to bear on 
this ambitious national initiative (Appendix A). 
This new structure also called for a new way of 
interacting with grantees. It left behind the cus-
tomary, more laissez faire relationship between 
program director and grantee, calling for Kellogg 
staff to be much more involved with and sup-
portive of the sites. The theory was that each site’s 
work would be guided by a common understand-
ing of the initiative’s goals forged among the 
program directors. Learning and successful strat-
egies would emerge from each site and be shared 
among the entire initiative’s participants.
Very early on, however, flaws in that structure 
began to surface. Foremost was that the staff serv-
ing on SPARK had a variety of reporting relation-
ships rather than reporting to one individual who 
had ultimate responsibility for the overall success 
of the initiative. This created an imperative for 
consensus that was very difficult to achieve: No 
matter how much work went into reaching agree-
ment, program directors’ individual experiences 
and interests constantly overrode the common 
understanding. 
The lack of a unified reporting structure also 
undermined the ability to coordinate staff activi-
ties and the messages they imparted to sites in 
the crucial early stages. As a result, throughout 
its early implementation phase, SPARK basically 
operated like eight separate initiatives, resulting 
in confusion and frustration among grantees and 
WKKF staff. Lines of authority and responsibility 
were obscured, which diminished a strong sense 
of owning the initiative within the foundation. At 
the same time, while the foundation was asking 
staff to operate in an entirely different way, staff 
performance was still tied to how many grants 
each program director was getting out the door. 
That wasn’t the kind of performance measure to 
promote effective teamwork.  
The multiple-program-director model also laid 
bare an unresolved, yet critically important, ques-
tion: How directive should the foundation be in 
terms of what it expected of the sites? Some staff 
felt the sites should be free to find their own way, 
since only they had the knowledge to adapt to and 
capitalize on local characteristics, as well as the 
experience to build systems that were truly effec-
tive for their children. Others felt that stronger 
guidance was needed, since sites were charting 
new territory and could benefit from a national 
perspective.
By the end of SPARK’s second year, it became 
apparent that the foundation’s staffing structure 
was a roadblock. Sites were doing good work and 
making progress, yet they were struggling to envi-
sion the broader change they were working to-
ward. What were the most essential components 
of the systems they were creating? What were the 
keys to the success of those systems? What were 
they learning that could move the entire cause of 
school readiness forward nationally?
Unless SPARK could answer those questions and 
achieve greater clarity, it would have limited abil-
ity to contribute to national progress or even have 
significant impact in SPARK states. It was plain 
that the initiative required more unified leader-
ship from Kellogg, and a management structure 
that supported a cohesive vision and consistency 
in working with individual sites and advancing 
the initiative as a whole.
In response, the foundation collapsed the multi-
ple-director model into three foundation manag-
ers and combined program and evaluation into 
the ongoing program management structure (Ap-
pendix B). The smaller foundation team provided 
The multiple-program-director 
model also laid bare an unresolved, 
yet critically important, question: 
How directive should the foundation 
be in terms of what it expected of the 
sites?
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some immediate relief to grantees. It eliminated 
conflicting directions and streamlined reporting. 
Kellogg staff, though, still struggled with how to 
approach the partnership with grantees. 
The desire was to strike a balance between being 
overly prescriptive and too open-ended. Kellogg 
was striving for empowered, insightful grantees 
that could discover for themselves what would be 
most effective for their communities, yet benefit 
from a more clearly defined vision of success as 
well as strategic input on the problems they were 
trying to solve. Kellogg wanted out of the power-
play dynamic that can infect philanthropic work 
and to work as a team with the grantees. Team-
work, though, requires trust, and trust takes time 
to build. Even with the smaller management team 
in place, grantees still felt somewhat adrift.
Momentum shifted when the new management 
team signaled clear Kellogg staff ownership for 
the initiative. They declared Kellogg’s intention to 
be not only a champion for the grantees, but also 
a leader in ensuring that SPARK produced results 
that could have national significance (Crutch-
field & McLeod Grant, 2008). The reconfigured 
management team convened all the SPARK site 
leaders to develop a shared vision of the future 
they were working toward collectively. 
The resulting vision (Figure 2) was significant be-
cause it unified the initiative, clarified the impact 
SPARK intended to produce, and helped elevate 
what had been a programmatic orientation to a 
cause orientation. For some grantees this came 
naturally and they defined their work in systems-
change terms. But others had a more program-
matic lens and moving to this cause view was a 
struggle. Both kinds of grantees, though, came to 
understand that through the cause orientation, 
SPARK leaders were explicitly seeking to create 
powerful and lasting change on a large scale for 
Every child will …
•	 experience a continuum of success – before school, upon entering school, and through the early 
school years – in acquiring and using learning skills.
•	 be supported by adults and institutions who understand what a child needs at each stage of 
development, are equipped for their role, and communicate with one another.
•	 be at the center of a system that values him or her as an individual and is determined to provide the 
foundation for lifelong success.
•	 be eager to learn, confident in his or her skills, and at home in learning environments.
Every parent will …
•	 be more knowledgeable about their child’s learning, social, and physical development and how to 
nurture it.
•	 be prepared to be proactive in advocating for their child with the professionals and institutions that 
serve their child.
•	 be welcomed as partner in education, with a restored sense of school ownership.
Every school will…
•	 view early childhood education as central component of its mission and key to student/school success.
•	 have highly qualified teachers and staff to serve young children, as well as well-defined approaches to 
ensure performance.
•	 view itself as a critical part of a larger early childhood education partnership, and be open and proactive 
in working with other members of that partnership to ensure child’s continuum of success.
•	 value every child, and strengthen its performance by continuous assessments of child’s learning skills 
and needs.
In every community …
•	 child-serving professionals and institutions will share the goal of ensuring early learning success and will 
work together to achieve it.
•	 a new early care and education system will lead to greater sense of purpose and satisfaction, high-
performing schools, and fewer social problems.
FIGURE 2  Shared Vision of SPARK Impact
Beyond the Grant
2011 Vol 2:3 85
young children, their families, and their commu-
nities, and Kellogg explicitly sought to help guide 
and accelerate similar progress nationally.
The Kellogg management team strongly and 
consistently encouraged sites to identify system-
building approaches that had proven highly effec-
tive in building transition and alignment between 
preschool and kindergarten, and had the potential 
to be adopted on a broad scale. They urged the 
sites to clarify the end results they were seeking 
for their states or municipalities. They reassured 
each site that it didn’t need to create a “perfect” 
system, but insisted that it produce and scale up 
approaches that could contribute substantially to 
a better system. The underlying assumption was 
that the sites would produce a range of approach-
es that could form important elements of a highly 
functioning system and, in so doing, together 
inform national progress. 
The Kellogg team underscored their commitment 
to the theory of change, and helped sites use it as 
a guide to determine how they could move from 
system development on a local scale to adoption 
of their systems and associated best practices on a 
large scale. This, too, helped elevate SPARK sites 
from a program-level focus to an emphasis on 
broader impact.
SPARK leaders and their key allies now knew 
what was expected of them, but understood that 
there were few restraints on how they got there. 
Kellogg had found its way out of the “prescription 
dilemma,” as one subject called it, and set a true 
partnership in motion.
That was a turning point. Some SPARK sites at 
first resisted the need to focus their strategies and 
elevate the scope of their ambitions, but relatively 
quickly all embraced the idea that doing so gave 
them greater clarity of purpose and a clearer 
path to success. Equally important, SPARK had 
transitioned from a collection of projects to what 
it had originally been intended to be: a coherent 
initiative that could achieve national impact.
The Kellogg commitment to large-scale progress 
had a significant effect on important SPARK site 
allies as well. One superintendent of a SPARK 
site system balked at the pilot size of the pro-
gram, arguing that pilots belie the urgency of the 
problem: “It’s like using a garden hose on a forest 
fire,” he said. The price for his cooperation was 
straightforward: Work to convert all my schools 
to ready schools or take your initiative elsewhere. 
The Kellogg management team joined with site 
leaders in meeting with him and, with the founda-
tion’s backing, the local SPARK team accepted the 
challenge. Looking back, the superintendent said 
that Kellogg could have easily have walked away, 
but didn’t because it had a clear commitment to 
the work and to achieving a major result.
Another SPARK ally reported that the “whole 
constellation of the foundation and the resource 
organizations made a big difference. They were 
troubleshooters and advisors.” He noted that the 
public policy and economic development argu-
ments were very valuable.4 
“We were a group of business folks with very 
little knowledge of early education,” he said, but 
their involvement with SPARK led to “discussions 
at a deep level” and spurred them to investigate 
and compare other models for early education. 
Their work with SPARK has convinced them that 
improvements in early education are not only the 
right thing to do, but also are a wise investment 
that will benefit everyone over the long term.
4 The Committee on Economic Development’s ongoing 
work on the cost/benefit of early education investment was 
influential.
The resulting vision was 
significant because it unified the 
initiative, clarified the impact 
SPARK intended to produce, and 
helped elevate what had been a 
programmatic orientation to a 
cause orientation.
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A Different Path for Technical Assistance
A question Kellogg faced from the outset of 
SPARK was how to ensure that sites gained the 
benefit of expertise they would need to succeed. 
As noted earlier, the eight grantees had a range 
of experience and ability in thinking in systems-
change terms, creating powerful collaborations, 
and advocating at the highest levels of policy-
making realms; and the SPARK management 
team had specific ideas about the kind of know-
how that would move the grantees’ work forward. 
Another concern was insuring the continuity of 
assistance from site to site; since they were linked 
in a national initiative, it was important that the 
sites received consulting of the same kind and 
caliber. As a solution, Kellogg decided to forgo 
the more traditional technical assistance route – 
providing funding to each grantee to hire its own 
outside consulting – and to assemble instead a 
collection of consultant groups that the foun-
dation would offer to the sites to support their 
SPARK work. Kellogg referred to this network as 
“resource organizations.”
As the initiative unfolded, however, an additional 
role for the resource organizations materialized. 
Foundation staffing, keyed to the portfolio-
management model, is typically very stable. The 
scale of the SPARK initiative, and its essence as 
a change-making operation that called for much 
deeper and sustained involvement, overwhelmed 
the capacity of the Kellogg team. The resource 
organizations became an extra “set of hands” for 
Kellogg to manage and assist the grantees with 
everything that was happening at the site level.
The first network of resource organizations and 
the attempts to connect them to the sites did not 
live up to the management team’s expectations. 
Like the struggle over how prescriptive the foun-
dation should be in the overall work, Kellogg was 
seeking balance deploying the resource organiza-
tions. It viewed the network as a strategic invest-
ment in the work to accelerate progress at the site 
and national levels, but it didn’t want to foist the 
group on grantees. The resource organizations 
were meant to represent to grantees that the 
foundation didn’t consider itself to have all the 
answers, that it truly wanted to engage in a part-
nership with the sites and offer resources they 
could use in the way that would best help them. 
But, like the mixed signals in the early man-
agement structure, the open-endedness of the 
arrangement made it difficult for grantees to see 
how the resource organizations’ particular skills 
and processes could move them forward. Some 
perceived Kellogg’s stance toward the resource 
organizations as ambivalent, while others viewed 
working with them as an added requirement of 
the foundation rather than as a benefit. The con-
fusion and discomfort with the arrangement was 
generally evident to Kellogg staff and the resource 
groups, but it was also communicated directly to 
them by many of the grantees.
 After this unsuccessful beginning effort to 
connect sites with external assistance, Kellogg 
recalibrated its resource-organization team and 
how it wanted that team to function. The new 
team included expertise in communications, 
evaluation, leadership development, community 
engagement, cause visioning, and policy develop-
ment. Kellogg presented the resource organiza-
tions and their capabilities to SPARK sites in 
initiativewide meetings and gave them substan-
tive roles in those sessions. Those meetings gave 
grantees a tangible sense of the kind of assistance 
the resource organizations could provide. As the 
grantees developed a clearer understanding of 
the broad change they were seeking and the path-
way to that change, they could envision how the 
consultants’ services would work for their efforts.
Another important management decision was to 
re-orient the relationship between the foundation 
and the resource organizations. The foundation 
encouraged the resource organizations to take 
intellectual ownership of the initiative and use 
their own discretion in guiding, assisting, and 
motivating grantees. It brought the resource-
organization network, independent of the sites, 
together on a regular basis for sessions to develop 
site- and initiative-level strategy, help coordinate 
resource organization activities, and share the 
foundation’s perspectives. The result was that 
resource organizations shifted their view of Kel-
logg from “client” to “partner,” which freed them 
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to weigh in with vigor on strategies relating to the 
initiative as a whole. 
Ultimately, the resource organizations had an 
impact on nearly every site. One grantee said, 
“If we had known early on what we know now 
about the resource organizations, we could have 
seen even more possibilities.” In concert with the 
Kellogg team, the resource organizations helped 
grantees define where they were most likely to 
succeed and to chart a path to make it happen. 
The resource organizations became “thought 
partners” for grantees. One remarked, “We are 
a small organization and had a gap in resources. 
We needed someone who can think and plan 
strategically.” 
Sites benefited from being able to speak frankly 
to people with an outside perspective and differ-
ent experience and skills. One site leader offered 
that the resource organization with which she 
worked closely “opened us up to new ideas that 
we wouldn’t have thought about ourselves.” 
Grantees drew on resource organizations to 
establish their evaluation plans, to create entirely 
new alliances, to link their work with others 
around the country, to discover funding streams, 
and to keep going. “We wouldn’t have made it 
without them,” one grantee said. “They pushed 
us, made meetings happen, helped us make con-
nections.” 
Resource organizations also played key roles in 
developing core SPARK messages and encourag-
ing their consistent application, and in defining 
key concepts, such as the characteristics of ready 
schools, that helped guide site work.
The process of putting the resource organizations 
together was intentional on Kellogg’s part, but 
how well the group functioned was unexpected. 
The combined resource-organization network 
was noncompetitive and extremely collaborative. 
Each one’s work informed the others’ and the ex-
changes were substantive. In an effort as far-flung 
as SPARK, coherence isn’t easy to reach or main-
tain. The resource organizations contributed to a 
sense of connection among the sites and between 
the sites and Kellogg. They emphasized what the 
sites had in common and what they were doing 
that had national significance. One observed that 
the resource organizations created “our-ness” for 
the SPARK initiative among all its players.
There were major contributing factors to this 
success. First, the Kellogg management team 
carefully selected the resource organizations 
not only for their expertise, but also for their 
perceived compatibility and their interest in the 
cause. Second, participation in the network had 
sustained involvement from the highest echelons 
at each firm. Lastly, Kellogg treated the resource 
organizations as an extension of their manage-
ment team in a shared cause, rather than vendors 
enlisted to execute tasks or functions. That said, 
the job of building and sustaining the resource-
organization network was arduous and required 
a significant investment in management time and 
dollars. 
Advocacy and the ‘Soft Power’ of 
Foundations
A nationally known foundation like Kellogg 
has the capacity to be a powerful advocate for 
change. But how can that capacity be realized to 
its greatest effect? SPARK provided some useful 
lessons.
Historically, Kellogg has been reluctant to play 
a highly visible role as advocate. The foundation 
defers to the people and institutions who are 
directly involved in an issue that it is support-
ing. SPARK, though, required something more. 
The idea of ready schools – of creating a bridge 
between the worlds of community-based early 
education and the traditional K-12 educational 
system – was so difficult and controversial that it 
Resource organizations shifted 
their view of Kellogg from “client” to 
“partner,” which freed them to weigh 
in with vigor on strategies relating to 
the initiative as a whole.
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was critical for Kellogg to lend its name more di-
rectly to this effort. There was a need for national 
leadership in drawing these two worlds together 
in order to create a more fertile environment for 
SPARK sites and for the impact of the initiative as 
a whole.
Kellogg had the advantages of national recogni-
tion and being viewed as unallied between the 
two sectors. But to be effective, the foundation 
needed a sound understanding of the landscape of 
potential support. Accordingly, Kellogg staff and 
one of its resource organizations had in-depth 
conversations with numerous national leaders 
in multiple sectors,5 in many cases representing 
membership organizations whose constituencies 
5 The organizations engaged in this process served a broad 
range of constituencies, including Head Start and other 
early childhood education providers; public school system 
superintendents, elementary school principals, K-12 
teachers, school board members and Title I administrators; 
elected officials at the local and state levels; businesses; 
parents; chief state school officers; social-service entities; 
philanthropies; advocacy groups; and early childhood 
education thought leaders.
are essential to the development of ready schools 
on a significant scale.
These discussions revealed substantial national 
interest in the development of “ready schools” – a 
core component of the systems SPARK was seek-
ing to create. Leaders did not view creating ready 
schools as a cause unto itself, but instead as a key 
component of the cause of ensuring the educa-
tional success of young children. They found the 
vision articulated by SPARK leaders to be compel-
ling, and they agreed with a ready school defini-
tion that includes strong community connection, 
recognizing that external support – support of 
individuals and institutions outside of schools 
themselves – is essential to create ready schools at 
full scale. Overwhelmingly, these leaders agreed 
that more work needed to be done to strengthen 
the role of schools in order to advance the school-
readiness movement, and they welcomed Kel-
logg’s leadership in this regard.
When Kellogg and its resource organization 
reported this interest back to SPARK grantees, 
it had a tangible effect. They derived confidence 
from this strong national support and were 
motivated to envision their ready-schools work 
as a major contribution to the advancement of 
early childhood education. They were able to 
tackle such highly charged issues as preschool 
teacher training and certification, the re-ordering 
of Title 1 funding, and the shared responsibility 
of schools in making sure that both children and 
schools are ready for student success starting at 
kindergarten. 
The foundation then tried to move the discussion 
to the next logical step among a select group of 
these national leaders. The hope was to develop a 
platform for federal and state policy change that 
would advance the new framework for early edu-
cation that SPARK represented: a comprehensive 
approach that sought to align the entire early-
learning continuum, from preschool right into the 
early grades. Toward that end, Kellogg convened 
three meetings. Unfortunately they were un-
able to chart a shared path forward, so Kellogg 
decided to set its own course. 
The idea of ready schools – of 
creating a bridge between the 
worlds of community-based early 
education and the traditional K-12 
educational system – was so difficult 
and controversial that it was critical 
for Kellogg to lend its name more 
directly to this effort. There was 
a need for national leadership in 
drawing these two worlds together 
in order to create a more fertile 
environment for SPARK sites and 
for the impact of the initiative as a 
whole.
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Kellogg staff, together with members of its re-
source organizations, formed a team to develop 
a plan to translate the community-based les-
sons learned from SPARK into policy change at 
the state and federal levels. The plan focused on 
advancing two concepts central to the SPARK 
framework: transition – ensuring that children 
have continuous success in learning and moving 
from one phase of progress to the next, from birth 
through the early grades; and alignment – ensur-
ing that the systems that serve young children 
are capable and effective in assisting that smooth 
progress. 
The SPARK team’s in-depth analysis of state poli-
cies indicated that while no state had a compre-
hensive policy on transition and alignment, sev-
eral were primed to develop one. Further, Head 
Start reauthorizing legislation was under way, 
which was prompting states to think about this 
policy area. In each of these states, however, there 
were only disjointed discussions and no unifying 
way of talking about policies and practices. Thus, 
the team’s goals were to:
 1. connect experts on transition and align-
ment policy and practices to the governors 
and key state education policymakers at the 
forefront of early childhood education;
 2. provide information that could deepen and 
accelerate their ongoing work;  
 3. motivate governors to prioritize Transitions 
from Early Learning to Early Grades and the 
alignment of curricula between the two in 
both their early learning and education agen-
das; 
 4. create a cadre of governors who could 
champion this area of policy as a key compo-
nent of early learning and education policies 
to other governors and to federal policymak-
ers; and
 5. position Transition and Policy Alignment as 
a key component of emerging discussion on 
P-16 education framework.
The Kellogg Foundation engaged state governors 
to conduct transition and alignment forums in 
five states: Arizona, Connecticut, Mississippi, 
Ohio, and Pennsylvania. These forums proved 
effective. 
Overall, the planning process for these forums 
helped state leaders crystallize their purpose and 
goals in advancing early childhood education. It 
also led states to develop conceptual frameworks 
on transition and alignment where none had been 
articulated before. The policy insights from the 
governors’ forums were captured in a Kellogg 
publication, with the Educational Commission of 
the States, entitled Linking Ready Kids to Ready 
Schools, which serves as a resource for other 
states looking to formally link the preschool and 
early education systems.
At the national level, Kellogg Vice President 
Greg Taylor provided testimony on SPARK to 
the full U.S. Senate Finance Committee as part of 
hearings on “Realizing Competitive Education: 
Identifying Needs, Partnerships, and Resources.” 
In addition, the Kellogg Foundation joined with 
the Education Commission of the States, Voices 
for America’s Children, the Children’s Leadership 
Council, and select members of the Learning First 
Alliance in conducting a national forum in Wash-
ington, D.C., on Linking Ready Kids to Ready 
Schools for members of Congress, their staffs, and 
other leaders.
The effect of Kellogg’s leadership was to cre-
ate a new climate for dialogue, breaking down 
Kellogg staff, together with members 
of its resource organizations, 
formed a team to develop a plan 
to translate the community-based 
lessons learned from SPARK into 
policy change at the state and 
federal levels.
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ingrained attitudes and practices and opening 
minds. As one grantee put it, “Changing minds 
has been the biggest job.” Prior to SPARK, there 
was no real outside pressure for educators, com-
munities, and parents to talk about, or under-
stand, the value of ready schools. The theory of 
change insisted on making those connections and 
having those conversations. One grantee reported 
that the Kellogg “name effect” was extremely im-
portant to drawing in outside partners and allies. 
Strategies like the governors’ forums underscored 
SPARK values and brought a sense of urgency to 
the work. Importantly, the forums and Kellogg’s 
congressional testimony elevated the grantees and 
their allies. “Five years ago, the governor wouldn’t 
give us the time of day,” one grantee said. “Now 
we’re on the inside.”
That kind of success notwithstanding, one grantee 
commented that “there is an unfinished feeling 
to the national policy piece”; other participants 
shared similar views. There is a sense that Kellogg 
could have used its influence to more actively 
engage high-level state education policymakers 
and leaders from the SPARK states to give them 
an appreciation of the scope of the ready-schools 
work and nascent ready-schools movement. 
Grantees, resource organizations, and the founda-
tion alike were disappointed that links between 
the national organizations engaged in school 
readiness and ready schools issues and the grant-
ees did not flourish. The concept of a national 
advocacy partnership had tremendous appeal, but 
implementing it proved difficult.
Summary
The view among grantees and their partners 
and allies is that SPARK will go down as a “game 
changer” in school readiness. The initiative raised 
the national consciousness, and the willingness to 
act, on ensuring that children are ready for school 
and schools are ready for them. SPARK sites will 
be the vanguard for that movement.
But SPARK also offers important lessons for phil-
anthropic institutions dedicated to social change 
on a national scale. Perhaps the most important 
lesson is that success can depend upon their abil-
ity to lead – to clearly define an end result and to 
take responsibility for its achievement. While giv-
ing primacy to the role of grantees in creating ap-
proaches that suit their communities, foundations 
must recognize and respect their own role as well: 
Grantees want foundations’ guidance, especially 
in taking their efforts to a level they have never 
before attempted. They want the benefit of knowl-
edge and resources foundations have developed 
by working on a national scale. And they need the 
active influence of these foundations in creating a 
more supportive environment for their work.
Foundations must be flexible in their approaches 
while remaining committed to achieving tangible 
progress. Social change is by nature a process of 
discovery, so there will always be a need to change 
tactics and even strategies when they aren’t work-
ing. But this must be done with a relentless focus 
on an end result. The Kellogg Foundation, like its 
grantees, often struggled during the SPARK ini-
tiative. But because it shared their determination 
to succeed, the struggle paid off.
Perhaps a final lesson is that success requires 
patience and persistence. SPARK was a seven-
year initiative. During that time, grantees and the 
Kellogg Foundation itself found their way through 
the highly complex work of building new systems 
of early childhood education and arrived at a level 
of clarity that allowed them to influence progress 
on a large scale.
SPARK also offers important lessons 
for philanthropic institutions 
dedicated to social change on a 
national scale. Perhaps the most 
important lesson is that success can 
depend upon their ability to lead 
– to clearly define an end result 
and to take responsibility for its 
achievement. 
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SPARK	  Management	  Structure	  Evolution	  
Appendix	  B	  
SPARK	  Phase	  II:	  Basic	  management	  structure	  (initial	  implementation)	  
(Internal	  Partners	  have	  primary	  reporting	  relationship	  to	  a	  different	  VP)	  
	  
VPP	  =	  Vice	  President	  for	  Programs	  
PD	  =	  Program	  Director	  
RO/RO’s	  =	  Resource	  Organization(s)	  
Mgr.	  =	  Manager	  
Comm.	  =	  Communications	  
Meeting	  Svcs.	  Mgr.	  =	  Meeting	  Services	  Manager	  
VPP	  
Grantees	   RO’s	   PD	   PD	  
Lead	  PD	  
Grantee	  
Grantee	  
Grantee	  
Grantee	  
PD	   PD	  
Grantee	  
PD	  
Grantee	  
Internal	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Mgr.	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Mgr.	  
Policy	  Mgr.	  
Meeting	  
Svcs.	  Mgr.	  
RO	  
RO’s	  
RO’s	  
Lead	  
Support	  
Grantee	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SPARK	  Management	  Structure	  Evolution	  
Appendix	  C	  
SPARK	  Phase	  II/III:	  Basic	  management	  structure	  (revised)	  
(Internal	  Partners	  have	  primary	  reporting	  relationship	  to	  a	  different	  VP)	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  
VPP	  
Grantees	  (8)	   External	  Resource	  
Organizations	  (5)	  
Internal	  Resource	  
Partners	  (2)	  
Lead	  PD	  
Lead	  Support	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